Chat Session with prof. Chip Blacker (October 9, 2002)

Andrei: Alright, welcome everybody! We have the first chat session today - with prof. Blacker. The rules are the following...

Andrei: I will name the University and one the students from that university will post the question for prof. Blacker. As he responds, he might put .... which means that he has not finished answering the question. When he is finished I will ask another University and so one.

Litvinskaya: Considering the fact that the balance of power system was characteristic of pre-WW I period and Cold War system - of 1945-1991, what are international relations and security based on nowadays?

Blacker: In my judgment the system, at least for the moment, is unipolar in character. But it's complex. . .

Blacker: Although the US currently deploys enormous power by most quantitative measures, the attacks of September 11 strongly suggest that there is a new kind of destructive power in play -- one for which we, by which I mean the world -- is not prepared. This is wholly unprecedented, and no one quite knows what to make of it.

Gureyev: Do you think the ABM treaty was produced mainly to preserve established deterrence strategy? Which treaties had similar effects in these terms?

Blacker: The entire panoply of arms control agreements negotiated from the late 1960s to the early 1990s were based on the logic of deterrence, meaning the mutual ability to incinerate one another. That's what's so significant about the US decision to withdraw from the ABM treaty...

Blacker: The withdrawal signals the decision by this country to depart from a "deterrence-only" posture and to investigate the possible utility of active defenses. This is evident also in the new National Security Strategy policy statement released recently by the White House.

Ternyak: don't you think that the USA take too much power to itself about ''punishing'' Iraq and consequences of it will influence all the world and all the contries will take the responsability about it. don't you guess that the USA is not the only state and it should bear it in its mind. I am sorry about the question if it can offend you.

Blacker: No offense taken. It's an excellent question. I do see a danger in other countries deciding to act unilaterally in response to some threat they perceive. But states have always reserved to themselves the right to take such action when confronted by a clear and imminent threat. . .

Blacker: What the US has done is elevate this principal to the very highest level of policy. In other words, the administration has enunciated its new policy preferences in the starkest and clearest of terms. The White House has been careful to say in recent weeks that the use of force should be a last resort, not the first. But I agree that this constitutes an important departure in policy for the US, and that the implications of doing so are hard to predict. . .

Blacker: In the end, I suspect we'll see further modifications of the US policy to deprive others of a pretext to strike unilaterally. This is a process, and as such the picture will change continually.

Romashov: Do you think that current political activity held by the USA is heading toward replacement of old system of deterrence by something entirely new.

Blacker: I wouldn't say entirely new. Policy based on deterrence is the aberration. We're returning to a system in which powerful countries will be willing to use their power more actively in defense of their interests. This is how international politics was organized and conducted prior to the advent of nuclear weapons and the development of bipolarity during the Cold War. . .

Blacker: The problem is this a world system that now has to manage, in a more active way, the presence of many different kinds of weapons of mass destruction. And we don't have any experience in doing so.

Perelygina: The last summit of the UNO showed that this organisation is in a deep crisis. At the same time, the USA seem to begin military operations in Iraq without the UNO'approval. Will not this become the beginning of the UN's disintegration and won't any state be able to act in the same way, if there is such a precedent? Won't it destroy the contemporary international security system?

Blacker: Another very good question. I agree that the credibility of the UN is at stake in the current crisis. The US position is that the UN has failed to discharge its responsibilities vis a vis Iraq, and thus undermined its own authority and prestige. Part of the what the US is trying to do -- very heavy-handedly, I would argue -- is to force the UN to back up its word with force, if necessary. I believe President Bush when he says US unilateral action is the last resort. But I also believe him when he says the US will act alone if UN fails to do its duty. . .

Blacker: It's a form of brinksmanship. That is, threatening the UN with irrelevance if it doesn't enforce previous and prospective Security Council resolutions. That said, the US has a demonstrable tendency to agree with the UN only when the Security Council does what we want it to do. And that, in the long run, is not good -- either for the US or for the UN. In general, US governments need to listen more and talk less.

Kuznetsov: Is it necessary to use nuclear weapons as the mean in the external and internal policy nowadays? For example the RF did not use it to threat any actor in the world, but the US used. What do you think about the problems of the military organizations (their biases, inflexible routines, and parochial interests) in the modern political relations and what is the place of such organizations? Must they be controlled by the civil institutes?

Blacker: You've asked two questions, really. Let me take them in order. Both the US and the Soviet Union threatened the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War -- the US by refusing the renounce the possible first use of such weapons in response to a Soviet conventional attack in Europe; and the Soviet Union in the design and deployment of its nuclear weapons, which were postured for a disarming first strike. . .

Blacker: US policy today is ambiguous. It's to deter Iraq and other actors from considering the use of any weapons of mass destruction against the US or its allies. . .

Blacker: On civilian control of the military, I couldn't agree more that sure civilian oversight is essential -- both because I want the politicians I elect to make decisions about war versus peace (since I can vote them out of office if I don't like their decisions) and militaries tend to be inflexible and too regulated by routine.

Malorosyanov: Prof. Blacker! In what way does Iraq threaten the USA, which is thusands of miles far from you? Besides, Iraq agreed to let the UN inspectors in the country, thus making american tough stand sort of ridiculous.

Blacker: As we learned in the 1991-98 period, having inspectors in Iraq is not guarantee that Iraq is free of WMD. The Iraqis are quite skilled in hiding both weapons and facilities from prying eyes. Best estimates are that the Iraqi have large aresenals of both biological and chemical weapons, the latter of which Saddam Hussein has used against both the Iranians during the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s and against the Kurds who live within Irags borders. . . The danger that Iraq poses is several-fold. Armed with nuclear weapons, it could potentially make demands against others in the region that would require concessions on the part of the weaker powers. The US is also worried about a preemptive Israeli strike to prevent Iraq from acquiring nuclear weapons. . .

Blacker: The real threat to the US is that either the weapons themselves or the techology to make them could pass into the hands of groups like Al-Qaeda, which would not hesitate to use them against the United States. . .

Kukharenko_N: Than the US apply double standards? I mean Israel that for sure has nuclear weapon also.

Blacker: My personal view is that Saddam Hussein is a murderous meglomaniac without whom the people of Iraq, the region and world would be better off. My strong preference, however, is that the people of Iraq deal him on their own, or failing that, that the UN intervene forcefully to disarm him and then remove him from power. But, as I've saide, the believe President Bush when he says that US will do it alone, if need be.

Kostanovskaia: As we all know the USA and the USSR did not succeded in preventing Chiness-Indian war. So do the USA (since it's now the only pole) have 1) an ability and 2)political will to prevent a nuclear arms race between China and India?

Blacker: Re Israel and nucs, and do six or seven other countries. But I don't lose sleep at night worrying about the French or the British or the Russians or the Chinese or the Indians or the Pakistanis or the Israelis actually using things -- except in the gravest of situations. I do worry about the Iraqi regime using chem, bio or nucs against an array of targets.

Blacker: Being the most powerful country in the international system does not being omnipotent. The US has the power to do certain things and to influence certain outcomes, but it can't prevent all wars or all arms races.

Burnakov: Professor Blacker, would it be right to regard such terms as “distribution of power”, “balance of power” and other terms which established on them and reflect the specific historical reality as outdated in historical sense?

Blacker: No, I don't think they're outdated. It still makes sense to speak of the "distribution of power" and the "balance of power," even in era of unipolarity. It's a way of measuring how unipolar (or multipolar) the system actually is. It's also a way of measuring trends -- is the system more or less unipolar today than it was 5 or 10 years ago.

Romashov: Do you think that the situation with Iraq is a kind of example of a preparation of a comventional war against suspected proliferator (according to Charles Glaser's arguments).

Blacker: Yes. But against a proliferator with a demonstrated willingness to use his power to deprive others -- Kuwait, for exammple -- of their freedom. It's not just the prospective acquisition of nuclear weapons that so disturbs the US administration, it's the fear that Saddam will either use them or provide them clandestinely to others. The urgency on the US side comes from the fear that the Iraqi's could be only months from acquiring nuclear weapons if they can obstain sufficient fissile material.

Zyryanova: Has any concensus been found about dealing with so called "rogue states"? Which states precisely are these exiles (the list of them varies in the literature)? And isn't that not quite fair to exile the whole nations, if their leaders are not your alies?

Blacker: I can't give you a good definition of "rogue states." Nor can anyone else, I suspect. It's certainly a term that is ripe for abuse, as your question implies. If I were speaking for the US administration I would say something like "a rogue state is non-democratic country that materially assists terrorists and terrorist organizataions."

Kiselev: Dear colleagues- The students had to leave for classes and left the following questions.Questions from students:1) Is it necessiry to use nuclear weapons as deterrence in the foreign policy nowadays.2) the issue of military organization in modern political relations(their biases, inflexible routines and parochial interests, 3) does the strategy of the disarmament is more dangerous today than that of proliferation 4) the poles in the modern world, the perspectives in USA-Russia relations

Blacker: I think in one way or another we've touched on the first three questions. Left me just say in reference to the fourth question, that relations between the US and the RF reflect the new distribution of power in the international system -- especially the foreign policy line espoused by President Putin after 9/11. I continue to believe that our relations have considerable potential for development; the trigger, however, has to be deepened economic ties, and eventually Russia's full integration into the international economic order. . .

Blacker: Let me thank all of you for joining in the chat session. It's been a real pleasure for me. And let me underscore how much we value your being part of the Stanford family. We're making history with this experiment, and I am confident the results of our collaboration will be important and consequential. Thank you all again. And from "the Farm," good night.

Andrei: Dear participants, thank you very much for your questions. I hope, you all enjoyed this meeting.

Besedin: Thank you Professor Blacker for your coming to chat with our students.

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